Net neutrality
Net neutrality — the debate, technological reasoning about what “net neutrality” really needs to be, and alternatives to the extremist positions of both sides on the net neutrality debate
Great debate on net neutrality
The Save the Internet folks report on a wonderful net neutrality debate. And what they have to say is totally compatible with my Tariff Rebate Passthrough proposal.
Key points:
- Prioritizing one KIND of application, like telemedicine or video downloads, over others is OK.
- Charging for that prioritization is OK.
- Favoring one PROVIDER of the SAME kind of application over another — e.g., Mayo Clinic vs. Johns Hopkins in telemedicine, or Google vs. Yahoo in search — is NOT OK.
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| Categories: Net neutrality, Public policy and privacy | Leave a Comment |
The false dichotomy of net neutrality, and the Tariff Rebate Passthrough solution
The hot technology-related public policy issue right now (at least in the US) is of course net neutrality. Here’s my take on it:
Both sides are being too extreme, and are painting a false dichotomy. But the proponents of net neutrality are much closer to being right than the laissez-faire telecom industry advocates. The principle that should guide net neutrality policy is Tariff Rebate Passthrough. What that means is:
- Telecom providers should be allowed to charge for superior QOS (Quality of Service).
- Information providers should be allowed to subsidize those charges for consumers, e.g. as part of a general subscription, or to induce them to view advertising.
- Telecom providers should not be free to cut their own deals with information providers. They should simply pass the QOS tariff rebates through to consumers on the information providers’ behalf.
| Categories: Net neutrality, Public policy and privacy | 6 Comments |
Layer 7 stateful deep packet inspection — the privacy threat is more serious than we thought
I’ve been reading up on net neutrality, and was just hit by an unhappy realization.
The technology that’s kicked off the whole debate is Layer 7 stateful deep packet inspection. This a feature of telecom equipment, originally found only in high-end firewalls, but now evidently found throughout Cisco’s (and surely also its competitors’) product lines. In IP telecom without this feature, the equipment just sees packets of data, and perhaps header information, but can’t look at the data’s content. However, when you’re looking at Layer 7, the equipment is looking at what the application sees. Everything is visible — every record, every word. And if Cisco’s marketing materials are to be believed, all that technology exists today.
The dangers this presents in terms of privacy and censorship, whether in the basically free countries or the basically authoritarian ones, should be obvious. Fighting for freedom is more urgent than we previously realized.